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Response by David N. Gibbs 
 
We have seen how invoking memory of the Srebrenica massacre has helped to justify 
humanitarian interventions in general, while suppressing criticism of these interventions. In his 
response to my article, John Theis of Lone Star College in Texas offers a case study of how such 
suppression is conducted. Theis recounts how his college invited social activist Michael Parenti 
to lecture on the subject of imperialism, and the college was subjected to an international 
campaign of intimidation – with eighty-seven separate letters directed to the college – aimed at 
preventing Parenti from speaking. The campaign was led by Balkan activists who objected to 
Parenti’s views on the Bosnian war.  
Note that I disagree with much of what Parenti has written on this topic, which in my 
view veers too far in the direction of minimizing well documented Serb atrocities. However, 
there is no excuse for trying to shut down Parenti’s lecture (which did not even focus on Bosnia). 
The Lone Star case draws attention to a larger issue, which is how bullying and threats have been 
used to stifle free discussion on the issue of the Bosnian war. There are numerous additional 
cases: When Ian Buruma wrote an article that questioned whether the idea of genocide applied in 
the Bosnia case, he was promptly denounced as a genocide denier; Buruma never wrote on the 
issue after that incident. In Croatia, when an aide to the president wrote a favorable review of a 
book that criticized Western intervention in Bosnia (it was actually my book), there was an 
orchestrated campaign to get the aide fired from his job. When a Danish member of ICTY 
tribunal criticized court president Theodor Meron for unreasonably pressuring other judges, he 
was promptly removed from his position, and then vilified on the Internet.1 Anyone who speaks 
critically on this topic, no matter how well qualified or mainstream risks damage to one’s 
reputation, which dissuades honest discussion. The Lone Star incident is far from the only 
example.  
In logic, there is the familiar fallacy ad baculum – the appeal to force – wherein someone 
seeks to “win” an argument by making threats against those with opposing viewpoints. The basic 
idea is “Agree with me – or else.” The ad baculum fallacy is now being used with regularity 
regarding virtually all discussions on the historical significance of the Bosnian war. Readers who 
think I exaggerate can easily find evidence on the Internet.  
And the Bosnia case has spawned a more generalized atmosphere of denunciation 
directed at critics of US and NATO interventions. The most recent example involved the 2011 
Libya intervention. Critics of the intervention were subjected to a systematic campaign of 
vilification in Internet-based sources, as well as the print media. 2 These attacks focused on the 
moral character of the anti-war activists, rather than their substantive arguments. To be sure, 
such personalized attacks have long been the province of the political right, associated with 
tradition of Joseph McCarthy. What is noteworthy about the present era is the extent to which 
such attacks often emanate from politically liberal or even leftist circles, where there is 
considerable enthusiasm for the idea of humanitarian intervention, along with a need to denounce 
                                                          
1 On the attacks against the Croatian presidential aide, see “Bosniak NGO’s Ask Croatian President to Take Action 
against his Advisor,” Dalje, January 18, 2014, http://arhiva.dalje.com/en-world/bosniak-ngos-ask-croatian-
president-to-take-action-against-his-adviser/495675; regarding the experiences of the ICTY judge, see Marie 
Dhumieres, “Judge Thrown off Yugoslavian War Crimes Tribunal for Criticizing ‘Change of Direction’ in 
Verdicts,” Independent, September 25, 2013. The attacks against Buruma can easily be found on the Internet.  
2 I have discussed this issue in D. Gibbs, “The ‘Decent Left’ and the Libya Intervention: A Reply to Michael 
Bérubé,” Counterpunch, November 25-27, 2011, http://www.counterpunch.org/2011/11/25/the-decent-left-and-the-
libya-intervention/. 
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opponents of intervention. The atmosphere of denunciation originated with the Bosnian war, and 
this has been one of the war’s most enduring legacies.  
Scott Laderman in his response rightly notes that the idea of humanitarian intervention 
had long preceded the Bosnian war. Appeals to humanitarian sentiments, he notes, had been a 
major justification for US policies in Vietnam, and indeed throughout much of the Cold War. 
The idea was that American military power was used altruistically to some extent, to protect 
people from the evils of Communism. Laderman is certainly correct on this point. Of course, 
humanitarianism also was used to justify colonialism in an earlier era (e.g. “the white man’s 
burden,” “la mission civilisatrice”). Clearly, the concept of humanitarian intervention is not 
novel.  
What was novel in the Bosnian case was the widespread invocation of the word genocide 
as a means of mobilizing support for intervention. This had the effect of engaging people’s 
emotions (“we have to do something!”), while shutting down the higher mental functions. One 
might say that, physiologically, it activated the amygdala, rather than the frontal lobes. The idea 
that genocide occurred in Bosnia, as well as Iraq, Libya, Syria, Darfur, and numerous other 
actual and potential interventionist targets has become nonfalsifiable; any objections that the 
word has been overused amounts to genocide denial, and is automatically unacceptable. One 
would think that people would reserve using the word genocide for only the more extreme forms 
of atrocities – in Rwanda for example3 – but this has clearly not been the case. 
One effect of this narrative has been to devalue of the whole concept of genocide by 
crying wolf too many times. Another effect has been to encourage one US intervention after 
another, while precluding any accountability for interventionist failures, including the ongoing 
wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. And Jean Bricmont notes new legislation in the US 
Congress, which seeks to further enshrine the idea of genocide prevention as one of the main 
pretexts for US militarism. Bricmont additionally reminds us how many hundreds of thousands 
of lives were lost as a result of these policies. All of this seems a peculiar way to memorialize the 
victims of the Holocaust, or the Srebrenica massacre. 
Bricmont also challenges some aspects of my article, specifically the section where I 
affirm the widely accepted view that the Srebrenica was orchestrated by the Bosnian Serb 
political and military leadership, including Radovan Karadžić. Bricmont seems uncertain that 
Karadžić helped orchestrate the Srebrenica massacre. I disagree with him. The basic facts of the 
massacre, including the involvement of Karadžić, have been so well documented that there 
should be no reasonable doubt regarding the record of what happened. The interpretation of 
these facts as constituting genocide or justifying military intervention is a separate matter. But 
the facts themselves seem clear. Bricmont recommends Diana Johnstone’s writings on 
Yugoslavia. In some respects, I liked Johnstone’s book Fools’ Crusade, particularly in its 
debunking of the dubious rationales for NATO intervention. But Johnstone shares with Parenti a 
dismissive attitude with regard to well established Serb atrocities, and Serb misbehavior more 
generally.  
Latha Varadarajan offers some friendly criticisms of my article, noting its inadequate 
treatment of US motives for intervening in the Balkans, and also its superficial assessment of 
whose interests were being served by intervention. She emphasizes the larger context in which 
the interventions occurred including “the almost overnight disappearance of the convenient ‘evil 
                                                          
3 It does not follow however that external military intervention in Rwanda would necessarily have improved the 
situation. For a sober view of the Rwanda case, see Alan J. Kuperman, "Rwanda in Retrospect: A Hard Look at 
Intervention," Foreign Affairs, January/February 2000.  
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empire,’ the sudden opening up of once unreachable potential markets, the shifts within factions 
of the capitalist class, the threat by the EC to strike out on its own,” among the various factors 
that influenced US policy in the Balkans. I agree with the criticism, though for reasons of space I 
was unable to address these larger points. I have however addressed the issue of US motivation 
at length in previous publications.4  
Kees Van der Pijl also emphasizes US motives for intervening in the Balkans. He asserts 
that the United States was seeking to parry post-Cold War challenges to its hegemony, 
emanating from a newly assertive European Community/Union, possibly in combination with a 
resurgent post-Soviet Russia. Van der Pijl is surely correct that the Europeans were actively 
mounting a challenge to US hegemony during the 1990s, at least in the financial and diplomatic 
realms, and also to some extent in the military realm as well. This challenge greatly worried US 
officials and business interests; countering this European assertiveness helped motivate the 
United States to intervene in the former Yugoslavia, as a means of showcasing US power as well 
as establishing a new purpose for the US-dominated NATO alliance. On the other hand, I have 
seen little evidence that Russia played any decisive role in the diplomacy of the Balkans, due to 
its exceptional economic weakness and the political disorder that followed the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. However, Russian anger at what they perceived as aggressive US-led interventions 
in the Balkan region, as well as the expansion of NATO, which was closely associated with the 
interventions, helped lay the groundwork for the US-Russia conflict of the present day.     
  
John Feffer’s Comments 
 
Since Feffer’s response is the most critical of my article, and since the issues he raises are 
fundamental to our understanding of US policy, I will reply at length.  
There is a familiar “standard account” of the Bosnian war, which asserts that US officials 
were passive throughout, and deferred to European leadership in managing the crisis. The 
passivity prevailed up until the summer of 1995, when the Srebrenica massacre finally shocked 
President Clinton into supporting NATO airstrikes against the Serbs – which saved the day. This 
account is a fairy tale. In reality US officials were actively engaged in the Bosnian conflict from 
the very beginning, and they were undermining international mediation efforts, as I have shown 
in my article. Reality aside, many intellectuals still hold with great conviction to the standard 
account. In his response, John Feffer offers a particularly spirited – if ill-informed – reiteration of 
the standard perspective. 
Central to Feffer’s argument is his claim that in 1992, Secretary of State “James Baker 
supported to the EC [peace] process, and at least formally so did [US Ambassador] Warren 
Zimmermann.” Once we remove the qualifier (“at least formally”), Feffer is denying that US 
officials did anything to impede the peace process in Bosnia. In fact, this claim is contradicted by 
a large body of evidence. I have already presented much of this evidence in my article, but given 
Feffer’s objection, I will now present this evidence more fully.  
The former Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia James Bissett emphasized the role of 
Ambassador Zimmermann in blocking agreement:   
 
                                                          
4 See for example, D. Gibbs, “Washington's New Interventionism: US Hegemony and Inter-Imperialist 
Rivalries,” Monthly Review 53, no. 4, 2001. Note that Dr. Varadarajan has more fully explored some of these issues 
in the following highly informative book: Emanuele Saccarelli and Latha Varadarajan, Imperialism: Past and 
Present. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. 
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Within days of the [Cutileiro] Agreement, the United States Ambassador, Warren 
Zimmermann flew to Sarajevo and met with Izetbegović. Upon finding that Izetbegović 
was having second thoughts about the agreement he had signed in Lisbon, the 
Ambassador suggested that if he withdrew his signature, the United States would grant 
recognition to Bosnia as an independent state. Izetbegović then withdrew his signature 
and renounced the agreement.5 
 
In other words, Zimmermann offered the Bosnian government a clear incentive – immediate US 
recognition – if they were to renounce the Cutileiro plan. I also note the previous quotes from my 
original article, including the New York Times, former State Department official George Kenney, 
and Cutileiro himself, which all point to a US role in blocking agreement. 
And contrary to Feffer’s claims, Secretary of State Baker also was working to scuttle the 
peace plan. According to the official Dutch investigation of the Bosnian war, “Baker’s policy 
was now directed at preventing Izetbegović from agreeing to the Cutileiro plan.” The section of 
the Dutch report that discusses this period is pointedly entitled, “The Cutileiro Plan and its 
Thwarting by the Americans.”6 Peter Carrington, a former British foreign minister and an EC 
mediator in Bosnia stated in an interview that the “American administration made it quite clear 
that the proposals of Cutileiro… were unacceptable.”7 Carrington also claimed that American 
officials “actually sent them [the Bosnians] a telegram telling them not to agree” to Cutileiro’s 
proposed settlement.8 Following the collapse of the peace plan, the Bosnian war commenced 
almost immediately.   
The above statements all contradict Feffer’s peculiar claims about US support for the 
Cutileiro effort.  
Feffer insists that the Serbs and to some extent the other ethnic groups would never have 
accepted a compromise peace plan, no matter what the US position. There is considerable 
evidence against this view. A published report by the Central Intelligence Agency, for example, 
notes that in April 1992, “the Serb leaders [in Bosnia] were probably still willing to accept a 
single state organized into a loose confederation divided into three ethnic ‘cantons,’” similar to 
the earlier Cutileiro plan.9 Clearly, US officials worried that a peaceful settlement of the Bosnian 
conflict was a realistic possibility – sufficiently so that that they made strenuous efforts to 
undermine the negotiations, as we have seen.  
In addition, Feffer implies that US officials could not possibly have influenced the 
actions of various Bosnian players against the Cutileiro plan, even if they wished to do so. This 
seems naïve, given the enormous clout that US officials wielded both globally and regionally 
                                                          
5 Website of James Bissett, “Balkan War, Balkan Peace, Balkan Future?” section on “Bosnia,” 
www.deltax.net/bissett/western/bosnia.htm. Emphasis added. The quote may contain a minor inaccuracy, since it 
appears that the actual signing took place in Sarajevo, not Lisbon; but Bissett’s main contention regarding US 
opposition to the agreement is well supported.  
6 Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, Srebrenica – A ‘Safe’ Area, 2003, pp. 395-400, 
http://publications.niod.knaw.nl/publications/srebrenicareportniod_en.pdf. The NIOD study was commissioned by 
the Dutch parliament.   
7 Carrington interviewed in the documentary film “Yugoslavia: The Avoidable War.” 
8 Quoted in Brenden Simms, Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia. London: Allen Lane, 2001, p. 
66. 
9 US Central Intelligence Agency, Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, Vol. I. 
Washington, DC: CIA Office of Russian and European Analysis, 2002, p. 140.    
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during this period, when the United States emerged as the world’s only superpower immediately 
after its victory in the Cold War.   
Following the failure of the Cutileiro plan, the European Community continued to seek 
diplomatic solutions to the Bosnian conflict, which extended over three years. These efforts were 
largely directed by David Owen, a former British foreign minister, who was an EC (later EU) 
mediator for Bosnia. One of several Owen-sponsored plans was the Vance-Owen peace plan. In 
his response, Feffer states: “The Vance-Owen accord… was undone by the Bosnian Serbs, who 
voted in Assembly against ratification.” In making this point, Feffer tendentiously focuses on a 
single snapshot event extracted from a highly complex negotiation process,10 in which all sides at 
various times alternated between intransigence and conciliation.  
And Feffer elides a key fact: US officials worked assiduously to sabotage the Vance-
Owen plan, a point repeatedly emphasized by Owen himself. Owen later testified as a court 
witness at the Milošević trial, which generated the following exchange: 
Milošević: “You described... that the new [Clinton] administration had already made up 
their minds and were intent on killing off the [Vance-Owen plan].” 
Owen: “There is no doubt that was what they were doing.”11 
In his memoirs, Owen added: “From the Spring of 1993 to the summer of 1995, in my judgment, 
the effect of US policy... was to prolong the war of the Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Whether prolongation was recognized [by the US] as being the policy I do not know.”12 
In short, US policy helped to cause the Bosnian war, and then became a key factor that 
enabled the war to drag on for more than three years, leading to 100,000 deaths, including those 
killed in the Srebrenica massacre. This is an appalling record. Feffer’s efforts to whitewash this 
record do little to increase our understanding.  
_____________________ 
 
I note that Josip Glaurdic and Robert Donia, whose work advances views similar to those 
of Feffer and whose books were criticized in my article, were both contacted by CRCP editor 
Ronald Cox, who asked for responses; Glaurdic and Donia declined to offer responses. 
                                                          
10 I have analyzed at length the collapse of the Vance-Owen plan in D. Gibbs, First Do No Harm: Humanitarian 
Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2009, chap. 6.  
11 Owen testimony, ICTY, November 4, 2003, p. 28560, icty.org. Emphasis added. Note that Owen was technically 
a court witness, but he was sufficiently valuable to the Prosecution that his testimony has been grouped under the list 
of Prosecution witnesses on the ICTY website.  
12 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, pp. 400-401. 
